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The U.S. No Longer
Makes the Grade

Economic Inequality Put an End to the “American Century”

I

By David S. Mason

n his State of the Union address last January, U.S. President Barack Obama said that
“anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our influence has waned,
doesn’t know what they’re talking about.” Former Utah Gov. Jon Huntsman, when in
the race for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination, warned that unless Americans
changed directions, they would see the “end of the American century by 2015.” As bright
and capable as both of these politicians are, they are both whistling in the wind. The
American century — the post-World War II era of U.S. global leadership and dominance
— ended a decade ago, and it is not coming back. While that does not mean the cessation
of American wealth and might, it does mark a significant transformation in U.S. society
and economics, and the country’s place in the world. To cope with this transformation,
Americans needs to recognize the nation’s relative decline.
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The “American century” as a term was the
title of an influential essay written in 1941
for Life magazine by its publisher, Henry
Luce. As Hitler’s armies stormed across
Europe, Luce called on the U.S. to shoulder
world leadership, come to the defense of ally
Britain in the wake of Nazi blitzes, and
“promote, encourage and incite so-called
democratic principles throughout the world.”
Such action would “inspire us [Americans]
to live and work and fight with vigor and enthusiasm” and, in turn, “create the first great
American century.”1 Indeed, in the next
several decades, the U.S. propelled world
trade and economic growth. Its science and
technology provided the leading edge of innovation and discovery. The country’s democratic institutions and educational system
served as beacons all over the world. Its
popular and consumer cultures were envied
and mimicked everywhere. And American
military prowess was admired and feared by
governments and revolutionaries alike.
Yet in recent decades, particularly since
9/11, every aspect of this American predominance has faded. The U.S. economy,
riddled with debt (both government and
household), has not yet recovered from its
steepest decline since 1946;2 economic expansion over the last decade, averaging just
1.7 percent, marks the most prolonged slow
period since the Depression.3 American education, once the world’s best, now ranks
near the bottom among developed countries.4 U.S. corporations, once exemplars of
dynamism, innovation and efficiency, are
hampered by bureaucracy, corruption and
bloated executive payrolls, and few generate ingenuity, growth or jobs, at least in this
country. Apple, for example, manufactures
almost all of its iPhones, iPads, and other
products overseas, when not long ago they
were made in America.5 While U.S. consumer goods and popular culture remain
fashionable in much of the world, there is
at the same time increasing resistance to
American culture and traditions.6 Witness,
for example, the global proliferation of the
“Occupy Wall Street” movements. Even the
red, white and blue political machine,
awash in money, is no longer the favored
method for political development.7 And the
U.S. Constitution is increasingly viewed in
other countries as antiquated both in its definition of government powers and narrow
sense of human rights (for example, not including gender equality or ensuring education or healthcare).8 And while America
used to be considered the epitome of economic opportunity and social mobility,
recent studies demonstrate that the U.S.
lags behind many other countries even on
this cherished value.9
The U.S. takes one step forward,
two steps back
These were all themes of my book,
The End of the American Century, published by Rowman & Littlefield in 2008
— before the economic collapse that
6
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began that year, and before the election
of President Obama. (Also, go online to
endoftheamericancentury.blogspot.com.)
In the years since, the situation has improved in some respects and worsened in
others, though the overall picture remains
the same.
On the positive side, Obama at least partially restored America’s international reputation — which had been so badly battered
by the George W. Bush administration with
the Iraq War, the flaunting of international
law, and the sanctioning of torture — by
ending the war, pledging to respect international law, banning torture, and promising
that the U.S. would be a better global
citizen.10 Also, Obama’s healthcare reform
brings the U.S. closer to the far superior alternatives of other developed countries.
And his economic stimulus plan helped stabilize the free-falling
economy and stem the
alarming upswing in
unemployment (at 10
percent at its worst in
late 2009 and down to a
little more than eight
percent as of July).
On the other hand,
the U.S. national debt
ballooned to more than
$15 trillion — dwarfing
the $10 trillion of 2008
that many historians and
economists thought was
unsustainable even then.
A quarter century ago,
in his book The Rise
and Fall of the Great
Powers, historian Paul
Kennedy pointed to the
U.S. federal debt, then at 44 percent of gross
domestic product, as a worrisome consequence of “imperial overstretch” — a
common feature of the historical collapse of
great empires. The only other historical
example of a great power becoming so indebted in peacetime was France in the
1780s, where the fiscal crisis was one of the
major causes of the French Revolution.
Today, Kennedy’s concerns seem almost
quaint, with the federal debt approaching
100 percent of gross domestic product.
Furthermore, in many other respects, the
U.S. continues to lose ground. Domestically, while the stock market and economy
have picked up somewhat, the unemployment rate of some eight percent remains
stubbornly high, with a persistence not seen
since the Depression era.11 Poverty rates are
among the highest since the early 1960s,12
and economic inequality is the highest
since the Depression, with the top one
percent earning almost 24 percent of the
nation’s income (as it had in 1928, too).13
Internationally, while the U.S. reputation
has been restored somewhat, American influence worldwide is waning. The U.S. was
unable to accomplish its stated missions in

either Iraq or Afghanistan, and the biggest
global political changes happening right
now — the “Arab Spring” and the rise of
political Islam — are almost totally
removed from any American pull, much
less control. Meanwhile, China continues
its march toward financial superpower
status, with the world’s second biggest and
fastest-growing major economy.
This multidimensional decline of the
U.S. is worrisome for American citizens
and leaders alike, of course, and is the
principal motive for the fragmentation and
bitterness in American political life. Job
loss and increasing poverty, in the face of
unprecedented corporate and Wall Street
wealth (with average CEO pay now
almost $13 million14), fuel protest and extremism on both the right and the left. The
roots of fear and hostility in the Tea Party
have much in common
with those of Occupy
Wall Street; both
camps feel marginalized and helpless visà-vis those in power,
whether in government
or corporations. The
2010 “Citizens
United” decision of
the Supreme Court, essentially allowing unlimited corporate contributions to political
campaigns, opened the
floodgates for money
in politics — an issue
that was a serious
problem even before
that decision. This
ruling will strengthen
the clout of monied interests in U.S. politics and almost certainly exacerbate the
doubt and alienation felt by ordinary
Americans. Indeed, a new national poll
shows Americans’ distrust of government
at its highest level ever.15

American education, once
the world’s best, now ranks
near the bottom among
developed countries. U.S.
corporations, once exemplars
of dynamism, innovation
and efficiency, are hampered
by bureaucracy, corruption
and bloated executive
payrolls, and few generate
ingenuity, growth or jobs, at
least in this country.

America gets in its own way
The polarized political environment —
intensified by sharpened rhetoric and bitter
invective (e.g., a congressman yelling “you
lie” at President Obama during the latter’s
fall 2009 speech to the chamber) — has
rendered almost impossible any effort to
address the huge and varied issues confronting the country. Furthermore, the very
issue of U.S. decline has itself become part
of the political debate, compounding this
predicament. Some, like the neoconservative historian and former State Department
official Robert Kagan, argue that the
decline of America is “a myth,” pointing to
the global acceptance of American values
and principles and the continued supremacy
of the country’s military.16 Many other politicians and commentators acknowledge and
rue American decline, but bicker about
whom to blame.

Two other factors complicate things: the
almost fanatical desire of Americans to be
No. 1 at everything; and the paradoxical
condition that the U.S. can be both the best
and the worst at the same time. This is the
case, for example, of both healthcare and
higher education. No one contests that the
best medical care in the world is available
in this country. But on almost every statistical measure (e.g., quality and access of
healthcare; infant mortality), the average
level of healthcare for American citizens
underperforms the industrialized world,
winding up near the rear.17 Similarly, the
U.S. boasts the world’s best universities,
but in international comparisons and international competitions, American students
fare abysmally.18
The main reason for this seeming
paradox is inequality. For those who can
afford it, the world’s best medical care and
best universities are there for the taking.
But the U.S. has the largest percentage of
poor people of any developed country19 and
the most unequal distribution of wealth and
income.20 The poor, often saddled with unemployment, broken homes, violent environments, ineffective schools, and inadequate health insurance, end up dragging
down the “averages” for the nation. It is becoming increasingly clear that inequality
hurts society as a whole. A recent global
study by the International Monetary Fund,
for example, found that countries with
strong economic growth tended to have
greater income inequality than those with
weak growth and concluded that “sustainable economic reform is possible only
when its benefits are widely shared.”21 Over
the past quarter century, this has not been
the case in the U.S., where the rich have
prospered, and the situation of almost
everyone else has stagnated.
Change the mindset to rise to the occasion
Economic inequality is, in my view, the
key to all other aspects of American domestic and global decline. This disparity
has widened steadily since the 1970s22
and is a major factor in the quadrupling of
U.S. household debt from 1975 to 2007
(adjusted for inflation).23 While the standard of living for most Americans remained unchanged during this time, the
rich got richer.24 And the top marginal tax
rate in 1963 was 91 percent but by 2003 it
had fallen to 35 percent. So the only
source for increased tax revenue — the
increasingly wealthy rich — was shortcircuited by a simultaneous and long-term
decline in tax rates for the wealthy. Consequently, the government was starved of
increased revenues to cope with the burgeoning poor, and the escalating needs for
healthcare, education, infrastructure, etc.
As citizens had to borrow more, so did
the government, fostering the liquidity
crisis both find themselves in now.
These problems did not originate with
Obama, or Bush, or any other single

president or political party. Over decades,
inequality grew, tax rates declined, poverty
increased, and household and government
debt mushroomed. Over a generation,
Americans consumed more than they produced, spent more than they saved — in
general lived beyond their means. What
took 25 years to develop cannot be remedied in a few years, or by one or two presidential administrations; corrections will
take at least a generation. Such plights are
not temporary or episodic, but structural
and systemic. They are both a cause of and
a consequence of global change as well: the
end of the Cold War and “bipolarity;” the
spread of economic globalization; the sway
of transnational movements and organizations; and the rise of new forces like China.
As financial expert and author David Rothkopf observes in his recent book Power,
Inc., lines have become blurred “between
corporations and individuals, companies
and states, nations and the global community.”25 The U.S., which so effectively
managed the changes of the postwar world,
is neither prepared nor equipped to deal
with these new challenges.
An even more difficult obstacle for
most Americans is psychological — recognizing and accepting that the U.S. is no
longer No. 1 in everything, and moving
on from that. There are, after all, considerable advantages to not being No. 1 internationally: less a target of resentment,
blame, and anger; and less frequently expected to intervene on international or
global quandaries. The country will more
easily be able to approach such issues on
its own terms. Becoming less voracious
consumers will reduce America’s substantial burden on global resources and the
environment, too. Similarly, in the domestic sphere, an honest recognition that the
U.S. is no longer “the first” or “the best”
in this or that will enable it to confront
those areas and try to redress them. It is
unlikely, for example, that America can
restore its global economic competitiveness until fixing the educational paradigm
and modernizing infrastructure.
The U.S. will not return to the easy
global dominance it enjoyed during the
American century. Its formidable military
power is now mostly irrelevant, perhaps
even counterproductive, in a world where
the biggest threats to humanity come from
climate change, terrorism, famine, and
disease rather than from armies charging
borders. America’s considerable economic
power is not the global juggernaut that it
once was. And the “soft power” of consumer society, popular culture, and political
schema has lost some of its luster as many
other countries have emerged with hipper,
more attractive, or more efficient models
(like China, Japan, Germany, and Brazil).
While the U.S. may not be No. 1 in any
single dimension, it remains a strong and
successful society in virtually every area of
human endeavor. This is perhaps the key to

understanding America’s continuing vitality, even in relative decline. There is no
other country quite like it, with its combination of democratic institutions, imposing
economy, entrepreneurial spirit, large population, abundant territory, and bountiful
materials. Harnessing all of this, once
again, will require wise and dedicated political leadership, and a spirit of common
purpose and compromise. It also will
require policies that enable the capable yet
provide for the poor. The American
economy is in transition from one based on
consumption, financial services, and debt
to something else, yet to be determined.
But because this transition is systematic, it
will be long-term, and in the process, many
people will be left behind by the old
economy or displaced by the transition
itself. Those people will have to be supported until the new economy is functioning properly and unemployment stabilizes.
This means sacrifices by all Americans,
and particularly by those who have benefitted so much from the lopsided growth of
the last 30 years, as the country strives
anew to make the grade. n
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